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1Abstract
If we understand well the individualization of land tenure rules under conditions
of growing land scarcity and increased market integration, much less is known about
the mode of evolution of the farm-cum-family units possessing the land. Inspired by
rst-hand evidence from West Africa, this paper argues that these units undergo the
same process of individualization governed by the same forces as property rights in
land. It provides a simple theoretical account of the coexistence of dierent forms of
family when farms are heterogenous in land endowments and technology is stagnant.
The paper also oers analytical insights into the sequence following which such forms
succeed each other.
21 Introduction
We have today a solid grasp of why and how land tenure rules evolve at the community level.
More precisely, we understand the conditions under which a shift occurs from corporate
ownership of land (possibly including the granting of long-term use rights to individual
households) to individualized forms of tenure ranging from less to more complete private
property rights. In particular, land tenure becomes more individualized when land value
increases because externalities are better internalized and stronger incentives to conserve
and improve land are thereby provided (Demsetz, 1967; Ault and Rutman, 1979; Feder and
Feeny, 1981; Feder and Noronha, 1987; Baland and Platteau, 1998; Platteau, 1996 and 2000:
Chaps. 3-4). However, the organizational features of the landholding unit itself evolve over
space and time and these variations are far from being understood. What we argue in this
paper is that the same force, growing land scarcity, that drives the individualization of land
tenure also drives the individualization of the family unit owning and managing the land.
Therefore, when private rights in land are well-established, as pressure on land continues to
rise as a result of population growth and/or market integration, the individualization process
goes on, yet now more at the level of the farm units than at the level of the community where
rules governing land allocation and tenure rights are decided.
As epitomized by the past experience of Russia or the recent-day experience of Mali
(West Africa), individualization at the farm-cum-family level occurs when either of the two
following circumstances arise: (i) the head of a collective farm decides to grant individual
plots to members of the household, and these are entitled to keep for themselves the entire
proceeds of such plots while they are simultaneously required to work on the collective,
family elds; (ii) the head agrees to split the stem household, implying that some members
leave with a portion of the land equivalent to a pre-mortem inheritance, in order to form
separate, autonomous branch households based on the nuclear family. While the rst scenario
3involves the transformation of a purely collective farm into a mixed farm, the second scenario
implies that part of the family land is inherited pre-mortem. The second scenario appears
to correspond to a more advanced form of individualization of the farm unit than the rst
scenario, yet the order in which these two forms should succeed each other as land pressure
rises is far from evident.
To explain this evolution, a theoretical framework is needed in which the behaviour of
dierent actors (the head and the members) and their strategic interactions are specied. So
far, economists have proposed few theories of the evolution of the farm-cum-family structure,
and the available theories aim at explaining either the shift from the collective farm to the
mixed form in which individual and collective elds coexist, or the breakup of the collective
farms into individual units.
Fafchamps (2001) oers an example of the former by developing a theoretical model to
explain the decision of the household head to allocate individual plots to family members. At
the core of his model is a problem of commitment. Because the head is unwilling or unable
to commit to reward their work on the family eld after the harvest, family members are
tempted to relax their labour eorts or to divert them to other income-earning activities. To
solve this commitment failure problem, the head decides to reward his wife and dependents
for their labour on the collective eld by giving them individual plots of land and the right
to freely dispose of the resulting produce. It is evident that the commitment problem only
exists if the short-term gain of deviating from cooperation (which means here reneging on the
promise to reward the workers for their eort on the collective eld) exceeds the long-term

ow of benets ensuing from a smooth relationship between the household head and the
working members. As Fafchamps himself recognizes this condition is restrictive, since the
game played within the family is by denition of a long (and indeterminate) duration, and
the discount rate of future benets typically low (future cooperation among close relatives
matters a lot). Moreover, even assuming that Fafchamps' hypothesis is valid, it remains
4unclear why there should be a tendency over time for collective farms to transform themselves
into mixed farms. Finally, Fafchamps does not consider a potential break-up of the household
accompanied by a (partial or complete) division of the extended family's landholding.
Other authors have tried to explain the coexistence of collective elds and individual
plots in agricultural farms, yet agricultural producer cooperatives or quasi-feudal landowner-
tenant relationships form the specic context in which their explanations are advanced. Re-
garding producer cooperatives, emphasis is typically put on the existence of scale economies
for certain types of activities, or on the need for insurance and the role of income-pooling
(Putterman, 1981, 1985, 1987, 1989; Putterman and DiGiorgio, 1985; Carter, 1987). As
for relationships between estate owners and workers, limited liability constraints and the de-
mand for insurance are the main motives prompting the adoption of the mixed farm structure
(Allen, 1984; Sadoulet, 1992).
We thus face a relative shortage of pertinent accounts of the existence of individual plots in
the precise setting of family farms. Unlike in democratic producer cooperatives, a hierarchical
relationship prevails in these farms, and in contrast to feudal or semi-feudal estates (where
independent tenants became re-integrated into a seigneurial estate when landlords decided
to embark upon direct cultivation of a portion of their land), their transformation typically
consists of a shift from the pure collective form to the mixed structure.
Farm breakups, the second form of individualization, are at the center of Foster and
Rosenzweig (2002) attempt to explain household-cum-landholding division. They do not
allow for individual plots, as for them co-residence implies collective farming only. In their
framework, an extended family is composed of several claimants to the land who may decide
to split if the benet of sharing public goods by co-residing is smaller than the loss of
eciency due to decreasing returns to scale in production. There are thus two dierent
ways of explaining the increasing incidence of individual farms: (i) growing disinterest of
younger generations in the sort of public goods produced on the collective farm, and (ii)
5rising importance of decreasing returns to scale as a result of the shift to more land-intensive
agricultural techniques.
Clearly related to the latter proposition is the work of Boserup (1965) who attributes
the rise of peasant farms to growing land scarcity and the consequent intensication of
agricultural techniques. Although formulated by a geographer, the underlying argument
has a distinctly economic 
avor, hence its large resonance among development economists
(Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986; Binswanger and McIntire, 1987; Pingali, Bigot and
Binswanger, 1987; Binswanger, McIntire and Udry, 1989; Hayami and Otsuka, 1985). As
land pressure increases, so the argument runs, farmers are induced to shift to more intensive
forms of land use, which implies that they adopt increasingly land-saving and labour-using
techniques. An important characteristic of these techniques is that labour quality, which is
costly to monitor, assumes growing importance. Given the incentive problems associated
with care-intensive activities (sometimes labeled \management diseconomies of scale"), the
small family or peasant farm in which a few co-workers (spouses and their children) are
residual claimants, appears as the most ecient farm structure.
Although Boserup's story is undeniably appealing, both theoretically and empirically,
it cannot apparently account for situations in which an evolution towards more individual-
ized forms of family-cum-farm structures takes place in the absence of noticeable technical
progress. Thus, in Russia during the 17-19th centuries, a shift from large and complex
agricultural households (married brothers stay together at least till the death of the father)
to smaller and more simple ones (married brothers part with each other while the father
is still alive, but a household may remain multigenerational) has occurred, a change which
historians generally ascribe to the expansion of non-agricultural opportunities rather than
to the adoption of new agricultural techniques (Worobec, 1995; Moon, 1999). In the old
cotton zone of southern Mali (West Africa), where the authors of this paper did eldwork,
collective farms appear to be increasingly replaced by mixed farms and small farms born of
6the break-up of large family farms, despite persisting technological stagnation.
Given the incompleteness of the theory proposed by Boserup, we set out to develop an
alternative framework susceptible of explaining individualization of family-cum-farm struc-
tures in conditions of rising land scarcity and technological stagnation. Toward that purpose,
we write a simple model in which the three aforementioned family forms are featured in a
static environment characterized by heterogeneous land endowments at farm level. Through
comparative statics, we check whether smaller land assets (or growing needs of members)
lead to individualization of the farm unit. It is implicitly assumed that adjustment to ris-
ing land pressure is easier to achieve through change in the family-cum-farm structure than
through demographic change and fertility reduction, or through land markets. While fertil-
ity reduction requires a long term horizon, land markets are highly imperfect owing to large
transaction costs or because the fear of losing land prevents the supply side of the market
from being activated (Basu, 1986). In this context, any change in land allocation is the
outcome of a decision regarding the organization of the family farm.
The intuition behind our model is simple. When deciding whether to give individual plots
and how large they should be, the family head faces a trade-o between considerations of
eciency in the use of the land and considerations of rent capture. For one thing, production
is more ecient on private plots than on the collective eld where the moral hazard-in-team
problem prevents optimal eort from being applied by family members. Since the head
must ensure that family members agree to stay on the family farm while they have outside
options available to them, awarding individual plots allows him to more easily satisfy their
participation constraints. For another thing, because the head's income entirely comes from
the collective produce owing to unenforceable transfers from the private plots, competition
between the family eld and the individual plots for the allocation of eort is bound to
cause a fall in the quantity of harvest appropriable by the head. In the case of a pre-mortem
split of the family farm, the total labor force available for work on the collective eld also
7decreases, whereas it is no more incumbent on the household head to provide for the needs of
the departed members. Depending on the relative importance of the aforementioned eects,
the father may prefer a mixed regime with individual elds to the collective regime, or he
may choose to split the family.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we mention empirical evidence from
Russia and southern Mali that is directly relevant for our topic. We focus attention on
observations that come in support of the central assumptions underlying the model presented
in Section 3. In this section, we rst set up the model, dene each regime and explore the
forces at play when choosing across regimes. In Section 4, we derive analytical results
regarding the role of reservation utility and land pressure in regime choice. In Section 5,
we present simulation results to illustrate the coexistence of the three regimes and further
analyze their occurrence in a reservation utility-land endowment space. Section 6 concludes.
2 A theory of the patriarchal family: supporting evi-
dence
2.1 Farm-cum-family structures in Russia in the sixteenth-nineteenth
centuries
Unique material collected by Russian scholars enables us to gure out certain important
aspects of the dynamic of household formation in Russia during the pre-industrialization
period (17th to 20th century). It shows striking similarities to the situation described below
for Mali, as well as some dierences. The following account relies mainly on the analysis
of the available historical material by Worobec (1995), henceforth labeled WO, and Moon
(1999), henceforth labeled MO. When other sources are used, they are referred to in the
conventional manner.
8Extended households and patriarchy
A large proportion of peasant households were composed of extended families compris-
ing several conjugal units, at least before the emancipation (1861). Pre-mortem household
divisions then constituted a departure from the norm (WO: 88, 107), implying that \most
newly married couples spent at least the rst part of their married lives in the household of
one set of parents" (MO: 179). Exceptions to the rule of post-mortem division were mostly
found among the households of Siberia and the outlying parts of the forest heartland, which
explains why at any given point in time households tended to be smaller and simpler in these
areas than in the central black earth region and other steppe regions as well as in the forest
heartland (MO: 170).1
Extended households were placed under the authority of the head, or patriarch. The
patriarch of the Russian peasant household \held absolute power over management of the
household economy and the labour input of family members" (WO: 11). This implied that
the head could encourage a son to take a job at a domestic industry, in which case he would
have \to remit his wages, minus any expenses incurred while he was away on the job, to the
household's coers" (WO: 11).
Household divisions typically took place at the death of the patriarch, often as a result
of internal tensions. It is rather easy to understand why families may split after the death
of the father. In the words of Christine Worobec: \if a son became household head upon
his father's head, he could not command authority over his brothers as had his father, since
all brothers were treated equally in the devolution of property. The other brothers were
intent on being masters of their own households" (WO: 81). This is conrmed by Moon's
account according to which splitting members were typically the younger brothers of men
1For a proper analysis of the dynamic analysis of peasant households, David Moon thus emphasizes the
need to distinguish between households that divide before and those that divide after the death of the head,
rather than between simple and complex households. In other words, the key dierence is between two types
of household life cycles: the \phases of development" cycle and the\perennial complex household" cycle
(MO: 179).
9who succeeded to headship on their father's death: \they broke away rather than submit to
their elder brother's authority" (MO: 171), and therefore parted with the stem household in
order to set up an independent farm unit on a portion of the family land.
Pre-mortem divisions
Pre-mortem divisions were also observed and they often stemmed from suspicions of
free riding. Tensions could arise because of the unequal sizes of the dierent conjugal units
forming the joint household. Thus, \a brother resented having to work twice as hard, or so he
believed, because one of his brothers had twice as many children" (WO: 81). But there were
many other pretexts or reasons nurturing jealous feelings among siblings. In particular, \the
relationships between daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law inside households was fraught
with tensions and jealousies" (MO: 196).
Especially after the abolition of serfdom and other reforms, in the late nineteenth century,
improved outside opportunities in the form of expanding opportunities for wage labour con-
tributed to a surge in pre-mortem ssions and the growth in nuclear family households (WO:
87, 115; see also Waldron, 1997: 71). Household divisions thus increased more rapidly in
areas \where a substantial portion of the population derived its income from non-agricultural
pursuits" (WO: 105), a phenomenon particularly noticeable in the central non-black earth
region and elsewhere in the forest heartland (MO: 176). The tendency for households to
split in such conditions was accentuated by the fact that wage-earning members sometimes
resented having to pay towards the upkeep of their father's households. If so, they tried to
keep all or part of the money for themselves, rather than hand it over to the head, which
could lead to severe con
icts and determine them to demand partition \so that they could
become the masters of their own households" (MO: 176, 196).
Distribution of individual plots
Individualization of peasant households did not necessarily take the form of a split of the
original stem household. Individual plots of land could be awarded to male members who
10continued to belong to the joint family. These members were expected to continue to help
their father and brothers in the cultivation of the household's communal land allotments.
The sons were responsible for their share of the tax payments charged on the joint household's
land and obliged to help support their parents when they retired. In return, they retained
rights to a share of the patrimony, minus whatever property was given them for individual
cultivation before the time of bequest. If, on the other hand, they stayed on the farmstead
but cultivated in a completely independent manner on a portion of the family's land, they
were disqualied for further inheritance (WO: 55).
2.2 A picture of present-day Mali
In 2006 and 2007, we conducted a systematic household survey on a random sample of 502
households belonging to 50 dierent villages in the districts of Koutiala, San, and Sikasso
(South Mali). In this section we use this data and report descriptive evidence regarding the
simultaneous presence of the three above-described farm-cum-family structures, the views
of local patriarchs on this evolution and the key assumptions that underlie our theoretical
approach.
2.2.1 Observations about the transformation of farm-cum-family structures
First, the activity of local land markets is extremely limited in spite of growing land scarcity
(in villages land is no more available for outsiders to settle on). The great majority of the
land parcels (80%) were inherited (post or pre-mortem), while the remainder were either
cleared by the owner a few decades ago (10%), or borrowed by the household.2 Moreover,
the local labour market is hardly developed so that land available per unit of labour is not
equalized across farms: farms are heterogeneous in terms of land-labour endowment. On
2Land lending is not synonymous of renting in the sense that no cash or in-kind payment is involved. The
land is often borrowed over several generations. With increasing land pressure, however, con
icts between
owners and borrowers have become more common, frequently because the family which borrowed land a
generation ago is reluctant to return it to the owner.
11the other hand, household members have outside opportunities available to them, mostly in
the form of migration to Malian cities or neighboring countries. Improved communication
and increased mobility have contributed during the last decades to enhanced perceptions of
potential employment opportunities outside the native village.
Extended households and patriarchy
In our sample, 23% of household heads live with their brothers while, at the other extreme,
only 10% have neither brothers nor married sons around (strictly speaking, they are nuclear
households). Moreover almost 60% of the household heads are polygamous. On average the
sample households count 11 individuals above 12 with a maximum family size of 33.
The family system functions as a patriarchy, implying that all important decisions are
taken by the (male) head, in particular those regarding the way land is allocated and income
is distributed on the farm. There are signicant facts pointing to the existence of a strongly
patriarchal society in southern Mali. Not only do customary inheritance rules exclude female
members, but there are also compelling clues attesting to the importance of the authority
exercised by the household head. The assumption of patriarchy implies not only that the
head decides whether part of the family land will be earmarked for individual plots or not,
but also whether some members (and how many) will be allowed to leave the stem household
and form separate branch households by using a share of the family land. On the collective
eld, the head is in complete charge of all important decisions. When individual plots exist,
management decisions including the choice of crop and supervision of eort belong to the
landholding member, yet the allocation of labor time between the collective eld and the
individual plot is xed by the head. Bear in mind, however, that the ability of the head
to set the timetable for work on the collective eld does not imply that he can control the
allocation of eective labour eort between collective and individual activities.
The authority of the head stretches beyond the production sphere. In particular, almost
all heads assert that members must seek their approval before taking a loan, and that they
12often avail themselves of this prerogative to refuse permission. They see themselves as acting
on behalf of the family and responsible for its ordered functioning, including the due loans
taken by members.
Finally, there is one domain in which household heads admit that their power is limited.
This is with respect to consumption choices made by children who have independent incomes
(from individual plots) and claim the right to spend them according to their own preferences.
In fact, the awarding of individual plots to members goes hand in hand with the devolution
of non-food expenditures to them.
Post- and pre-mortem divisions
Family splits occur when some members leave the stem household to form their own
independent branch household while the head of the extended family is still alive. About
one-fourth of the sample heads belong to that category and most of them have received a
fair share of the family's land endowment. In about 60% of the cases, the custom has been
followed, implying that at the death of the family head, the eldest living brother or his eldest
son (living on the farm) has succeeded him to exert authority over the family and the farm.
In the remaining cases, the family has separated at the death of the head. At least part of
those break-ups may be termed customary, however. When a patriarch rules over four or
ve generations of his brothers and his brothers' descendants indeed, the custom is that sons
and nephews of the deceased patriarch found branch households under the authority of the
oldest sibling. Separation of the household is then accompanied by the division of the family
land, and splitting is not, strictly speaking, the outcome of a decision of the household head.
Like in the case of Russia, breakup of the stem household may also occur when brothers do
not get on well enough to operate together in the absence of the father.
The main reasons given by the heads of branch households to explain why they them-
selves broke away from the stem household are rising land pressure in the stem household
(34% of interpretable answers), and the eruption of con
icts within the family, most often
13involving their brothers or uncles (again 34%).3 Other reasons include low production in the
stem household, and the existence of special needs that could not be satised if the member
had stayed with the whole family (expensive medicine to cure a wife, for example). We will
focus attention on the rst eventuality in which land pressure is the primary cause of family
breakups. It must nevertheless be borne in mind that as attested by well-substantiated evi-
dence, village or community-level con
icts, including intra-family disputes, are often caused
by acute scarcity, real or anticipated, of available land assets. There may thus be a signicant
overlap between the tow dominant motives alleged to lie behind household splits (Andre and
Platteau, 1998; Haugerud, 1993: 162-176).
Distribution of individual plots
Not only branch households but also mixed farms are found to coexist with traditional
collective farms in the Koutiala-San-Sikasso region. In particular, individual plots allotted
to male members living on the farm have been observed in about one-fourth of our sample
households. It is moticeable that, when this is the case, all male members above a certain
age have received a private plot. Moreover, the practice of giving out individual plots is on
the increase, and growing land scarcity seems to be associated with this increase: households
which have granted individual plots to (male) members turn out to have signicantly less
land per male member (3.01 ha) than those running pure collective farms (3.67 ha).
Perceptions of the family heads regarding the causes of ongoing transforma-
tions
When queried about the reasons underlying the trend toward growing individualization
of farm-cum-family structures, whether in the form of mixed farms or broken-up households,
the heads whom we interviewed in Mali pointed to increasing land pressure and consump-
tion needs, particularly among the younger generations. As land becomes scarce, so the
rst argument runs, family heads nd it increasingly dicult to provide for the subsistence
3These percentages are based on answers given to open questions that we later classied into categories.
14needs of the extended family from the collective eld. They claim that land scarcity leaves
them with no other choice than to let some family members acquire more autonomy through
the ability to cultivate individual plots or to form separate branch households. Another
oft-heard explanation refers to what senior villagers call \modernity", understood as the
greater consumption needs of the young generations. The rhetoric is that, nowadays, young
people have new needs, such as a motorbike, nice clothes, sometimes even a cellular phone...
Analytically, this change may be captured by an increase in the reservation utility required
by household members to continue to work and stay with the head. Because they perceive
to have better outside opportunities, typically in the form of migration to Malian cities or
neighboring countries, they feel able to demand a higher level of welfare. Improved commu-
nication and increased mobility have no doubt contributed to these enhanced perceptions of
potential employment opportunities outside the native village. Note the conceptual analogy
between the two explanations: an increase in the extent of needs to be satised from a given
amount of land appears to be the converse of a decrease in the amount of land available
to satisfy a given extent of needs. In practice, however, the two outcomes are caused by
dierent forces: rising numbers, on the one hand, and increased market integration, on he
other hand.
2.2.2 Evidence in support of the key assumptions behind our theory
The theory developed in the subsequent sections rests on three central assumptions that are
derived from key insights obtained in our eld research in Mali. The rst assumption concerns
the patriarchal form of authority that rules over the family farms. Since it has already been
amply substantiated above, we focus our attention on the other two assumptions, namely:
￿ Owing to non-observability of individual labour eorts, incentive problems discourage
production on the collective eld, especially when eort on this eld competes with
15eort applied to individual plots.4
￿ The whole income accruing to the head is obtained from the output of the collective
eld because, while this output is observable (as an aggregate) by him, output on
individual plots is not easy to monitor. This assumption is consonant with the obser-
vations reported in numerous anthropological studies (see Du
o and Udry, 2004, for
references).5
First, regarding the incentive problems plaguing collective production, many heads have
explicitly referred to them while discussing the practice of individual plots. For them, the
main shortcoming of such plots is that family members tend to relax their eort on the
collective eld, thereby impairing yields. Complaints such as \more eort is applied to the
individual plots and when members work on the collective plot, they are tired" or \members
are prone to keep energy in reserve for their individual plots"6 are commonly expressed by
family heads. They suggest that the granting of individual plots exacerbates the problem of
moral-hazard-in-team on the collective eld.7 On the other hand, dierentiating payments
according to individual eort contributions to collective production is hard not only because
such contributions may not be easy to measure but also because as has been stressed by
family heads in the interviews, accusations of favoritism or unfair treatment will be inevitably
aroused by this practice, leading to vicious intra-family con
icts.
As far as our second assumption is concerned, the crucial fact is that members who
cultivate an individual plot tend to keep the entire production for their own consumption,
or that of their children. Only 6% of them \helped" the household head in the previous year
4Incentive problems also arise if the head observes eort but chooses to use an equal sharing rule to avoid
intra-family con
icts.
5In their words, \A voluminous literature makes it clear that individuals have substantive control over
decision on their plots, and that nominal control over the output from a plot belongs to the cultivators."
6In the French parlance used by our interlocutors, members possessing private plots \se r eservent".
7Another shortcoming of individual plots which has been frequently cited by our respondents is the risk
of intra-family tensions and con
icts arising from the coexistence of collective and individual activities. Such
risk is linked to the moral-hazard-in-team problem since manifestations of labour shirking may easily prompt
accusations of misbehaviour among family members.
16through transfers in cash or in kind, and when they do occur such transfers are typically
very small. It is revealing that a large majority of household heads admit that members
who possess an individual plot have no obligation to transfer income to them. Also revealing
is the fact that most household heads consider that, when individual plots are awarded,
they are no more responsible for the nancing of marriage-related expenditures including
brideprice payments. Such expenses now befall the holders of individual plots.8
3 A simple model of family farm structure
3.1 Two important clarications
Before we present the formal structure of our theory, we need to address two important
questions the answers to which will condition the way we set up our model. The rst
question concerns the mode of remuneration of household members for their eort on the
collective eld, whereas the second question has to do with the nature of the participation
constraint in the event of splitting. Let us examine them in turn.
3.1.1 Contractual form
Given the specic context of the family farm, a share system appears as the (second-best)
ecient contract even when risk considerations are abstracted from. This conclusion rests
on the argument developed by Eswaran and Kotwal (1985), according to which the con-
tract choice problem can be framed as a trade-o between the need to provide tenants with
adequate incentive to apply eort, on the one hand, and the need to use the landowner's
management skills to the best possible extent, on the other hand. When the relative advan-
tage of the landowner in using his management skills and the relative advantage of the tenant
in using his supervision abilities are suciently important, Eswaran and Kotwal show that
8In terms of the model developed later, granting individual plots relaxes the participation constraint.
17the share contract dominates the xed rent contract (in which the landowner's management
skills are poorly used but labour incentives are optimally generated) and the xed time wage
rate system (in which the workers have no incentive to apply any eort but the landowner is
optimally induced to use his management skills). In the context of the family farm, Eswaran
and Kotwal's argument is especially relevant: not only is the landowner (the family head)
physically present on the farm but, far from being passive, he is typically eager to achieve
overall supervision of agricultural operations and to take important decisions, such as choos-
ing which crops to grow, xing the calendar of all the productive tasks involved, setting the
days of the week and the hours of the day when members have to work on the collective
eld, etc.
It could be objected that, since the head is willing and able to supervise agricultural
operations, he is also in a position to enforce any eort level that he considers appropriate.
The xed time wage rate contract would then be optimal. However, close supervision of
family members is avoided not only because it would involve costly eort for the head
but also because it would create a calculative atmosphere that would rouse suspicion and
resentment, potentially destroying the delicate balance on which more or less harmonious
family relations depend (see Williamson, 1985). Combining self-supervision by members
with overall decision-making by the head through the use of a share contract thus appears
as the most ecient contractual arrangement.
Under a mixed farm structure, family members apply eort to both the collective eld and
their private plot, yet when cultivating the latter they also use their own management skills
which they have learned while working on the former (bear in mind that members receive
a private plot only when they reach adult age). On the private plots, therefore, members
exercise management skills which they are prevented from using on the collective eld. The
question arises as to why the head does not use the management skills of the members instead
of his own on the collective eld. The answer is that management responsibilities need to
18be integrated under a single authority: if they were delegated to family members, a serious
coordination problem would be created, and the head would be compelled to continuously
intervene to settle disruptive con
icts. The implication is that, when a whole team of family
members are involved in joint production, the role of unifying management decisions is
critical, hence the signicant relative advantage of the head in using his management skills
when production is a joint activity (for a similar argument made in the context of small-
scale marine shing, see Platteau and Nugent, 1992). There is an additional reason that
prompts the head to apply his management skills to the collective eld. Since consumption
of basic necessities is centralized under his authority in the extended household form, and
consumption decisions are closely re
ected in production decisions (which crops to produce,
when and in what proportions) in semi-autarchic farm households, the head is keen to make
his choices prevail in the collective family sphere.
At this juncture, it is interesting to stress that a xed rent contract is not a feasible
arrangement under a mixed farm structure in which eort is more eciently applied on the
individual plots than on the collective eld. In other words, the situation in which the head
would simultaneously opt for a mixed farm structure (implying division of the available
land into both a collective eld and individual plots) and charge a xed rent for the use
of the land in the collective eld, does not correspond to a Nash equilibrium. Assuming
that the head uses a mixed share-cum-xed-rent contract, he could always raise his rent by
marginally decreasing his share of the harvest and increasing the xed component. This is
because he would thereby mitigate the eciency losses that result from the share system on
the collective eld. As a result, the value of the share parameter tends to zero, and the xed
component absorbs the whole production on that eld, leaving the members forced to achieve
their reservation utility entirely from the output of their private plots. (If this were not true,
the head could always increase his rent by enlarging the size of the individualized holdings
where there is no moral-hazard-in-team problem.) Such an outcome, however, cannot be
19an equilibrium: since members would not obtain any reward from their work eorts on the
collective eld, they would not put in any eort and the head would receive zero income.
The conclusion is that a mixed farm system may be an equilibrium only if the head's rent
is a pure share of collective production. Or, conversely, if the head charges a xed rent for
the use of his land, the farm must have a purely collective form (it must be integrated).
A formal proof exists to show this impossibility of the xed rent contract under a mixed
farm structure with heterogeneous production conditions on the collective and private elds
(rst-best eciency is achieved only on private elds).9
Finally, it must be noted that, when a member leaves the family farm to set up his own
farm unit on a portion of the family land, he combines his management skills with own
labour eort to produce output. In this respect, his situation is identical to that of the
extended family's member who works out his individual plot in a mixed farm system.
3.1.2 Participation constraint in the event of splitting
So far, we have pointed out that household members have a reservation utility that the head
must satisfy in order to keep them in the native community. At the same time, we have
observed that the standard practice (in both Russia and Mali) in the event of splitting is
for the head to let some of his sons set up their own independent farm on the portion of
family land to which they are rightfully entitled under the customary patriarchal inheritance
system (equal division of the land among all sons). In fact, it is only when a (male) member
decides to leave the family against the wish of the living head that he may be disinherited
as a punishment for his rebellious decision.10 In other works, when (male) members leave
9It has been shown that the arrangement in which eorts on a collective eld are rewarded by free access
to a private plot is actually equivalent to a sharecropping contract that would be applied on the whole farm
area (Allen, 1984). But this arrangement is not a realistic option since it implies that eort on the collective
eld can be monitored costlessly so that rst-best eciency is attained on both types of landholdings. It is
typically justied by risk-sharing considerations.
10Note that, since it is not the outcome of the head's decision, or at least an agreement with him, we
do not model this kind of eventuality which in any event appears to be rare in our study area. Our focus
is on the question of the optimal farm-cum-family structure that the household head wants to establish or
20the stem household with the consent of the head, they obtain their whole inheritance share
pre-mortem.
In keeping with this observation, we assume below that when he contemplates the pos-
sibility of splitting the stem household, the head compares the rent which he obtains under
the status quo (either the pure collective or the mixed farm) with the rent that he would
get if he were to let one, two or more male members quit with their rightful share of the
family land. The utility thus achieved by an independent (male) member of the family is
not smaller than the reservation utility (since this would imply that the farm size is not
large enough to enable all dependents to reach the reservation utility in a rst best case of
productive eciency.) This causes a discrepancy between the utility of those sons who stay
within the stem household and the utility of those who have left to form branch households.
The advantage thus gained by the latter may be temporary in so far as the rst members to
leave are the elder, earlier married sons who are perhaps oing to be succeeded later by their
younger brothers. It may also be more apparent than real if the independent sons have a
(larger) family to sustain.
Because we want to keep the model as simple as possible - as we shall see, even a simple
model of the kind envisaged is not easily tractable - we abstract away from complications
arising from the age structure and demographic characteristics of the family. All sons are thus
assumed to be identical, and we do not highlight the possible factors justifying dierences
in (reservation) utility between remaining and departing members.
When we discuss our results, we will nonetheless return to the case that we have just
ruled out. The assumption of a uniform participation constraint which holds in all the
three regimes implies that, in the event of splitting, a departing member would receive an
amount of land just sucient to aord him the reservation utility. It will be evident that
the predictions obtainable under such conditions are much less rich than those derived from
maintain, given that he has to make the best possible living from it while satisfying the reservation utilities
of the members.
21our basic model.
3.2 The general framework
A household head has N male family members of whom n live and farm with him, and N  n
have formed independent households. The male members who left each received an equitable
share of the father's total land endowment, A. This area, A
N, can be seen as a pre-mortem
inheritance transfer. Thus, when the father chooses to let N  n members leave the extended
family to form their own separate households, the area remaining for the extended family
farm is A = nA
N . Labor on the stem household's farm is supplied by male members who have
stayed with the head. The agricultural production function is f(a;l), where a is land and
l is labor. An individual's utility is x   v(l), where x is the production that the individual
consumes and l the level of labour he exerts. The function v(l) is the disutility of labor.
The head allocates available land A between a collective eld, where the male members
work together, and individual elds, where each works individually and for his own bene-
t. We assume that members operating inside the extended family farm receive an equal
treatment with respect to both the division of the produce of the collective eld (hence the
existence of a moral-hazard-in-team problem) and the apportioning of the land earmarked
for individual farming. Therefore, if the head decides to grant individual plots, each member
receives AI  A
n.
Members consume the whole production of their individual elds, implying that the
father's entire consumption R is obtained from his share   1 of the output produced on
the collective eld, A   nAI, R = f( ).11 In keeping with our eld observations again,
we thus assume that there is no possibility of income transfer from household members to
the head. When AI = 0, we say that the farm structure or regime is a pure collective farm,
11This implies that the moral-hazard-in-team problem cannot be overcome through the choice of appro-
priate contracts of a more requiring form. We justify this assumption in Section 5.1.
22whereas if AI > 0, it is mixed.
One unit of labor, whether applied on the collective eld or on the individual plot, causes
the same disutility . Therefore, member's j utility can be written as xj   v(lC
j + lI
j), where
xj is the sum of the share received from the collective eld and the production from his
individual plot, lC
j is the level of eort applied to the collective eld, and lI
j that applied to
the individual eld. Members have an outside option that provides them utility u, giving
rise to a participation constraint.
The problem is a two-stage game. In the rst stage, the head chooses ;AI and n. In
the second stage, members observe these choices and individually decide how much eort to
apply to the collective eld and how much to their individual plot. We restrict our attention
to symmetric Nash equilibria in the second stage. This allows us to solve for a single pair
(lC;lI), and to write the whole problem as follows:
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Total labor on the collective eld in the incentive compatibility constraint is written
lC
j +(n 1)lC to stress that each member takes the behavior of others as given when deciding
how much eort to apply to that eld.
233.3 Giving out individual plots?
A rst question to ask is the following: under which conditions does a household head nd
it optimal to distribute part of the family land to male members for private use, when n
members remain on the farm to cultivate A? The problem is not trivial since there are two
forces working in opposite directions. On the one hand, unlike the collective eld, individual
plots are used eciently. As a consequence, a smaller amount of land has to be dedicated to
meeting the members' reservation utility under a mixed system than under a pure collective
regime. On the other hand, incentives to work on the collective eld decrease when there is
competition between the family eld and private plots. This is because the worker is a full
residual claimant on the latter whereas on the former he suers from both the moral-hazard-
in-team problem and the disincentive eect of the share system of labour remuneration.
Eciency on the land wherefrom the father derives his income is therefore impaired.
Unfortunately there is no explicit solution for the head's rent in either regime, even when
a Cobb-Douglas production function and a quadratic cost of eort are posited. As a result,
we cannot directly compare the head's rent between regimes. To understand the underlying
logic of the model, however, it is useful to analyze the trade-os faced by the head when he
decides to allocate individual plots. We consider the problem in a sequential manner. First,
let us dene (AI) which is the optimal  for a given AI. Let us now examine how the value
function of this degenerate problem varies when AI changes. If @V
@AI((AI)) < 0 for all AI
such that 0 < AI  A
n, the head will not allocate individual elds, while if, @V
@AI((AI)) > 0
over some range, the head may choose to allocate individual elds.
Suppose that AI is xed. When there exist both a collective eld and individual plots, we
can replace the members' maximization problem with the rst-order conditions with respect




























































In order to analyze the sign of @R





















This expression reveals that as AI increases (by one unit), the size of the collective eld
decreases (by n units), and the rst term indicates how, everything else being constant,
the family head's rent declines with the size of the eld from which it is extracted. The
second term captures the lower incentives for male members to work on the collective eld
as AI increases (we show in appendix, section A.2.1 and A.2.2, that  is positive). For
a given amount of eort, indeed, the marginal product of labour falls when land becomes
smaller. The third term re
ects the negative impact on R caused by the enlarged size of
the individual plots: members have more incentive to spend eort on their individual plot
because the marginal productivity of labour has increased for a given amount of eort. As
a result, the cost of their eort on the collective eld is now higher (we show in appendix,
section A.2.1 and A.2.2, that  is negative).
The last two terms of equation 9 indicate how a change in AI modies the participation
constraint, and how this aects the head's utility (bear in mind that   0 since the head's
rent increases if the participation constraint is relaxed). Other things being equal (the
25distribution of labour eorts being constant), reallocation of land from the collective eld
to individual plots has the eect of enhancing the ability to produce u on the latter and
simultaneously decreasing the ability to do so on the former. Measured by the marginal
productivity of land in the two locations, this combined eect is positive overall because
incentive problems exist on the collective eld but not on the individual plots.12
It is therefore possible that, over some range of AI values, @R
@AI > 0, implying that the
household head may prefer the mixed regime over the pure collective regime.13
3.4 Splitting the family
To understand the eects of splitting the family, we examine the eects of a unit increase in
the number of members who stay within the extended family.
Whether in the pure collective or in the mixed regime, if the head decides to keep one




















The four terms have an intuitive interpretation. The rst term in both expressions is the
land endowment eect. When one more member stays on the farm area, the total farm is
bigger (when a male member leaves, he receives a fraction 1
N of the total land endowment
of the family, A), but the collective eld does not increase by this full amount in the mixed
regime since the additional member receives and individual plot. Furthermore the head may
adjust the size of all individual plots as a response to the change in family size. The second
12Indeed, assuming constant returns to scale, we have fA(AI;lI) > fA(A nAI;nlC). This follows directly
from the rst order conditions of dependents' labor allocation which implies fL(AI;lI) < fL(A nAI;nlC),





13In fact, if there exists an interior solution to the father's problem, it occurs at a point where the
participation constraint binds. Indeed if the sons are able to achieve their reservation utility by just relying
on the production of their individual elds,  = 0, and the head's rent is unambiguously decreasing in the
size of individual plots. This case is treated in appendix, section A.2.1.
26term is the labour endowment eect: the increase in the size of the labour force working
on the collective eld has a positive direct eect on total production. The last two terms
are linked to incentives. We label the third term the labour incentive eect, and the fourth
term the compensation eect. The third term indicates how the individual incentive to
work on the collective eld is eroded when an additional member stays on the farm, thereby
accentuating the moral-hazard-in-team problem. We show in appendix (section A.3.1 for
the case of a split occurring in the collective regime, and section A.3.2 for the case of a split
occurring in the mixed regime) that, as expected, this term is negative. The fourth term,
nally, depicts how the head adapts his rent to the constraint of providing for the subsistence
of an additional member. We prove in appendix (sections A.3.1 and A.3.2) that this term is
also negative because @
@n < 0: by way of adjusting to the deteriorated work incentives (on
the collective eld) and to the necessity of feeding one more mouth, the head allows male
members to keep a greater share of the collective eld's production.
Reasoning in the converse way, an important lesson to draw from the ambiguous sign
of @R
@n is that, by inducing a son to leave the stem household and form a branch household,
the family head is not certain to increase his own income. This is in spite of the fact that
he does not have anymore to provide for the consumption needs of the departing son and
that the incentives to work on the collective eld improve for the members who stay on the
farm. There are, indeed eects working in the opposite direction: the departing son stops
working on the collective eld, and is moreover oered a share of the family land assets that
is subtracted from the land available to the residual stem household.
274 The eects of land scarcity and increasing consump-
tion needs
4.1 Analytical results
Recall that one of the main reasons given by local elders for the increasing prevalence of
extended family farms with individual elds, and of family splits, is the increase in land
pressure. In terms of our model, such increase may be measured by a decrease of the land
endowment, for a given family size. The other main reason is that (male) members have
greater consumption needs than in the past. This change may be captured by an increase
in the reservation utility, u.
In this section, we test whether these explanations can be supported by our theoretical
framework. We examine rst how the head's incentive to give out individual plots changes
with the family land endowment and the members' reservation utility. We then examine how
the head's incentive to split the family is aected by the same variables. In each case we
summarize our results in a proposition and refer the reader to the appendix for a presentation
of the complete formal proofs. These results are derived on the basis of a Cobb-Douglas
production function (f(a;l) = al1 ) and a quadratic cost of eort (v(l) = !l2). Before
embarking upon such a task, however, we want to establish a set of intermediary results that
concern the evolution of the head's share, . More precisely, we wish to determine how 
changes (1) when land becomes more scare and the reservation utility of members increases
within the domain of the strictly collective regime or the collective regime, and (2) when the
head decides to shift from the former to the latter regime.
We show that, in accordance with intuition, the head lowers his share of collective output
when, within the strictly collective or the mixed regime, land becomes more scarce or the
members' reservation utility is raised (see appendix B.1 for the detailed proof). Lemma 1
28states this result.
Lemma 1 When, under either the strictly collective or the mixed regime, the family head is
confronted with more constraining conditions in the form of a reduction of A or an increase
in u, he responds by decreasing his share of the collective output, . Furthermore, when A
tends to 0 or u tends to +1,  tends to zero.
Much less clear is the case where a regime shift occurs, because two contrary eects are
at work when competition emerges between the collective and the individual elds. On the
one hand, being keen to mitigate the eects of such a competition, the head raises the share
of collective output accruing to members so as to incite them to apply eort to the common
eld. On the other hand, he wants to make precisely the opposite move in order to make up
for the unavoidable decrease in the level of collective output from which he draws his entire
income. We show that the second eect outweighs the rst, thus establishing the following
lemma (proof in appendix B.2:
Lemma 2 When the family head decides to shift from the purely collective to the mixed
regime, he simultaneously raises his own share of the output obtained on the collective eld.
Let us now look at the eect of land endowment on the choice between the mixed and
the pure collective regimes. It is stated in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 When land is very abundant, the head always prefers a pure collective farm
to a mixed structure where male members have individual plots that they cultivate for their
own benet. As land becomes scarce, however, the mixed structure may become more attrac-
tive.
Specically, if the head of a collective farm is just indierent between operating the farm
as a pure collective unit or as a mixed unit, a marginal decrease in land endowment induces
29him to strictly prefer the mixed regime over the collective regime. Conversely, a marginal
increase in land endowment induces him to strictly prefer the pure collective regime. Since
we cannot prove the existence of a point of indierence between the two regimes, we must
distinguish two cases. Indeed, as A goes from +1 to 0, either the collective farm remains
superior over the full range of land endowments, or the mixed farm dominates below a critical
level of land endowment.
Let us now turn to the eect of reservation utility on the choice between the mixed and
the pure collective regimes.
Proposition 2 When the workers' reservation utility is very low, the participation con-
straints of members are not binding and the head always prefer a pure collective farm to a
mixed structure where male member have individual plots that they cultivate for their own
benet. As the reservation utility increases, however, the mixed structure may become more
attractive.
Suppose, in particular, that the head of a collective farm is just indierent between
operating the farm as a pure collective unit or as a mixed unit. A marginal increase in the
reservation utility induces him to strictly prefer the mixed regime over the collective regime.
As u goes from 0 to +1, either the collective farm remains superior over the full range of
reservation utility, or the mixed farm dominates above a critical level of reservation utility.
That the participation constraint is not binding when the reservation utility is very low
and the head chooses the pure collective form is not surprising. Since members receive a
share of the output obtained on the common eld as remuneration for their eorts, it is in
the interest of the head to provide them with sucient incentive to work even if it implies
paying them above their reservation utility.
Next, let us consider the eect of land endowment on the choice between splitting the
family and keeping it whole.
30Proposition 3 When land is very abundant, the head of a purely collective farm will not
accept to let some male members leave with a portion 1=N of the land endowment. Con-
versely, when land is very scarce, the head of a purely collective farm or a mixed farm will
choose to split the family and let some members leave with a portion 1=N of the land. Fur-
thermore, there exists a unique level of land endowment 0 < A < +1 that makes the head
of a purely collective farm just indierent between letting some male members leave with a
portion 1/N of the family land, and keeping the family whole.
Finally, we have to elucidate the eect of reservation utility on the choice between splitting
the family and keeping it whole.
Proposition 4 When the members' reservation utility is very low, the head of a pure col-
lective farm will not accept to let some male members leave with a portion 1/N of the land.
Conversely, when the members' utility is very high, the head of a purely collective farm or
a mixed farm will choose to split the family and let some members leave with a portion 1/N
of the land. Furthermore, there exists a unique level of reservation utility 0 < u < +1 that
makes the head of a purely collective farm just indierent between letting some male members
leave with a portion 1/N of the family land, and keeping the family whole.
In short, these four propositions reveal that for large A or small u, the pure collective
regime dominates the mixed regime and the head will not split the family. Conversely, for
small A or large u, the mixed regime may dominate the collective regime, and whichever
of these two regimes prevails, some splitting will occur. While the analytical exploration of
the role of land endowment and members' reservation utility conrms our intuition about
the role of these two factors, it does not yield a complete set of predictions. For example,
we cannot be sure that for small values of A, a family head operating in the pure collective
regime will not choose to shift to the mixed regime before splitting the family. Hence the
31need to resort to simulation in order to obtain results that allow to examine whether in a
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Figure 1: Partition of the land endowment - reservation utility space into regimes.
Our simulation work is summarized in Figure 1 where the family land endowment is measured
along the vertical axis and the members' reservation utility along the horizontal axis.14 What
are the main results emerging from this gure?
14The simulation is conducted using the software Mathematica. For a given (A;u;N), for all 1  n  N,
we numerically solve for the head's share in both regime. In the mixed regime, when he gives out individual
plots and for decreasing sizes of the collective eld. Practically, in the case of the results presented below, we
decrease the size of the collective eld by steps of 0.25. In Mathematica we use the command \FindRoot", to
obtain  when the participation constraint binds. For each n, we then compute the head's rent for each size
of the collective eld and compare it to his rent in the collective regime. For each n we thus know whether
32To begin with, the results analytically obtained in the previous section stand conrmed.
First, the pure collective regime appears to be superior to all the other regimes in the
upper left portion corresponding to small values of u. Moreover, the triangle-like shape
of the strictly collective zone indicates that the smaller the reservation utility u, the lower
the threshold value of A above which the pure collective regime dominates the alternative
regimes (the zone expands in size as we move to the left in the upper part of the graph).
In other words, pure collective farms may subsist even in conditions of acute land scarcity
but only provided that exit opportunities for members are suciently bad. Conversely, they
may withstand the pressure of rising outside opportunities if land is suciently abundant.
Second, the area corresponding to the pure collective regime lies entirely above the areas
corresponding to the mixed regime, collective farming-cum-splitting and splitting with indi-
vidual plots. Third, when the head operates his farm under the pure collective regime and A
becomes suciently small (or u suciently large), he chooses to split the family. And when
the head operates a mixed farm and A becomes suciently small (or u suciently large),
he also chooses to split the family. Fourth, the mixed regime emerges as the optimal farm
structure when the reservation utility is not too small and the farmland area is not too large.
The use of simulation also brings to light a number of results that cannot be derived
analytically, and therefore add to the knowledge acquired in the previous section. The main
nding here concerns the sequence in which optimal regimes succeed each other, as we vary
the values of A or u. As A is marginally lowered, or u is marginally raised, a head operating a
pure collective farm may split the family while clinging to collective farming in the remaining
portion of the stem household. When A is lowered, or u raised, to a larger extent still, the
head may instead choose the mixed farm in which all members stay in the stem household
but obtain access to individual plots. Finally, when the change in u or A values is made
the head will choose to give out individual plots, and the maximum rent the head can obtain when he keeps
n members on the family farm. Comparing the head's rent over the range of n, we determine whether the
head prefers to split the family (n < N), or not (n = N). The parameters used are: N = 10, " = 0:7 and
! = 0:5.
33even greater, splitting the family while granting individual plots to the members who stay
with the head becomes the optimal regime.
Why is it that as land becomes more scarce, or as exit options of family members improve
beyond a point, split-cum-collective farming becomes preferable to collective farming even
before the mixed regime (which, on the face of it, is a less individualized form) becomes
optimal? This apparently intriguing result has to be seen in the light of the fact that
we allow for partial splits of the farm-cum-family, which may prove superior to the mixed
farm structure while more complete splits would not. Indeed, the split regime evinces great

exibility inasmuch as the head chooses how many members to let go. Both regimes entail a
reduction of the farm area devoted to the collective eld so that (some) members can produce
on their own plot to meet (part of) their needs. Correspondingly, a portion of the workforce
ceases to be available for the collective eld. In the split-cum-collective farming regime, this
decrease takes on the form of a reduced number of workers with the attendant result that
the moral-hazard-in-team problem is mitigated. But this is not the case under the mixed
regime. There is thus an obvious tradeo between the size of the workforce available to work
on the collective eld (larger under the mixed regime) and the extent of the moral-hazard-
in-team problem (also greater under the mixed regime). What our results indicate is that
the latter, adverse eect outweighs the former benecial eect when land is not too scarce
(or the reservation utility is not too high), while the reverse is true when land scarcity (or
the reservation utility) exceeds a certain threshold.
5 Caveats and alternative frameworks
5.1 Caveats
When eort is continuous, as we have seen, there is no explicit form for the head's income in
the mixed regime (even with a Cobb-Douglas production function). Unfortunately, assuming
34discrete eort levels does not provide clearer insights into the issue at hand. In particular, we
remain unable to derive threshold values of land endowment and reservation utility such that
the head would be indierent between the collective and the mixed regimes. The diculty
arises from two sources. On the one hand, the existence of two types of elds between which





2;0). The problem is then that several cases must be distinguished
that give rise to dierent (explicit) forms of the head's rent under the various regimes. On the
other hand, the moral-hazard-in-team problem on the collective eld is not well addressed
when a few discrete eort levels are considered.
The contract theory literature proposes several solutions to eliminate or mitigate moral-
hazard-in-team problems (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005). We implicitly assume that these
solutions which include punishing the team of agents or stimulating competition among
them are not feasible in our empirical context. An example of the former solution arises
when aggregate output is observable (as in our farm), and this information is used by the
head to punish the workers as a whole for excessive shirking. In particular, if observation of
aggregate output reveals that rst-best eort levels were not applied, the head could refuse
any labour payment. Such drastic punishment, however, is not conceivable in a poor economy
where farm members critically depend on collective production for their livelihood, and where
guaranteeing subsistence to all members is a customary duty of the head of a family. Another
important customary duty of the head is to preserve the unity and harmony of the family.
This objective makes the second type of solution inapplicable. As we have already pointed
out earlier, indeed, dierentiation of labour payments among members (assuming that the
head has sucient clues about individual eorts to rank them) is bound to cause frustrations,
recriminations and accusations of injustice.
355.2 An alternative framework with an altruistic family head
Relaxing the assumption of a strictly selsh patriarch at the head of the farm and simultane-
ously removing the participation constraints provide interesting insights into the functioning
of our model. More precisely, it reveals that the key feature driving the comparative static
results obtained lies in the participation constraints. It is, indeed, the tightening of these
constraints under conditions of improved outside opportunities for members, or of growing
land scarcity, that induces the family head to put more weight on eciency considerations
so as to be able to satisfy them. As we know, this implies a transformation of the farm-cum-
family structure toward more individualized forms. Consider such an alternative framework
in which there is no participation constraint, but the head has an altruistic utility func-
tion. Altruism can be construed as meaning that the head attaches a positive weight to the
members' welfare while making his allocative decisions or, alternatively, that members exert
pressure on him to the eect that he takes their interests into account. In the former case,
the weight put on the members' welfare re
ects the head's degree of altruism while in the
latter case it re
ects the bargaining power of the members.
When we work out the numerical solutions to this newly dened problem, we nd that
the three farm-cum-family structures may again arise, yet it is only for relatively high levels
of altruism (or members' bargaining strength) that individualized forms are preferred by
the head. The second nding, however, contradicts the comparative-static results obtained
under the initial model: the farm-cum-family structure chosen is insensitive to variations in
land pressure. This is because, when conditions become more stringent, the head now has
the ability to transfer part of the welfare loss to the members whereas he had to operate
under binding participation constraints in the base model. Thus, if he is suciently selsh to
prefer the pure collective farm structure, he will stick to it under conditions of increasingly
severe land pressure. Eciency gains are thereby lost in conditions where they matter much,
yet this is not the main concern of the head since by accepting a reduction of the collective
36eld, his income loss would be greater than when the farm remains purely collective. In
other words, in the absence of participation constraints, an increase in land pressure does
not aect the outcome of the trade-o between eciency in production and the head's ability
to extract incomes.
5.3 An alternative framework with a uniform participation con-
straint
Let us now assume that the participation constraint is uniformly dened across the three
regimes that is, in the case of a split, a departing member leaves with just enough land to
reach u on his new farm. In that case, predictions regarding the transformation of the farm-
cum-family structure are much weaker than those achieved in the base model. In particular,
if we can still predict that, when land becomes very scarce, the head of a purely collective
farm or a mixed farm will choose to split the family (at least in part) it is no more possible
to assert that this strategy will never be observed when land is very abundant. The reason is
straightforward: if land is abundant and the reservation utility is low, the family head may
nd it protable to let some male members to leave the farm. This is because ensuring the
leaving members their low reservation utility implies that they will receive a small amount
of land and this may well be a low price to pay to improve eciency by mitigating the
moral-hazard-in-team problem.
6 Conclusion
On the basis of a stylized representation of a patriarchal family farm, and in a context of
absent land markets, it is possible to use a simple analytical structure to account for possible
transformations of a collectively operated farm based upon an extended family unit. More
precisely, as land scarcity increases, or as exit options available to family members improve
37(say, as a result of growing market integration), the pure collective farm will unavoidably
become inferior to alternative farm structures from the standpoint of the family head who
draws his entire income from a share of the collectively produced harvest. One of these
alternative forms is a mixed farm structure combining a collective eld with individual plots
of land. When a competition thus exists between these two types of elds, the reward
function on the collective eld is a share contract (the xed-rent contract is not a Nash
equilibrium). Another possible form is a regime in which branch households are formed as
a result of the decision of the patriarch to allow the split of the stem household and the
concomitant division of the extended family's assets. In the remaining part of the stem
household, collective cultivation may be combined with individual elds, but this is not a
necessity. As the number of (male) members leaving the stem household may be any number
between zero and the total number of them in that household, there is a large variety of
alternative forms to the pure collective farm, and each of them needs to be considered in a
comparison between possible farm structures.
In spite of the analytical simplicity of the basic farm structure contemplated in our
model, a complete comparison turned out to be quite complex and we had to resort to
the simulation technique in order to obtain a complete mapping of regime choice into a
reservation utility/land endowment space. The most signicant result is the following: as
land scarcity increases (or as exit options for members improve), splitting the main household
while sticking to the pure collective mode of operation in its remaining portion appears to
be the rst alternative farm organization able to supersede the pure collective farm. It is
only at higher levels of scarcity (or exit option levels) that the mixed farm structure becomes
the optimal organization from the patriarch's standpoint. And it is at still higher levels that
splitting combined with individual plots in the remaining stem household emerges as the
best solution.
The above result critically hinges on the existence of participation constraints. In the
38absence of such constraints, an increase in land pressure does not aect the outcome of the
trade-o between eciency in production and the head's ability to extract incomes. This is
evident, for example, when we assume that the family head is altruistic. Other variants of
our model have less signicant consequences. Thus, assuming that members with individual
plots can make income transfers in favor of the family head would, for obvious reasons,
make the pure collective farm less appealing than alternative forms. Furthermore, if we
assume that disutility of eort is greater on the collective eld than on the individual plots,
the case of individualization is again strengthened. In the other way around, the presence
of scale economies in the production of the collective eld and in the consumption of the
collective produce would enhance the advantages of the collective farm and enlarge the region
of its feasibility. Likewise, the presence of xed costs, such as storage costs, increases the
advantage of mixed farms over branch households as a way of individualizing the collective
farm structure as land becomes more scarce. Finally, allowing for dynamic considerations of
the sort considered by Boserup could only reinforce our conclusion that rising land pressure
leads to more individualized farm-cum-family structures.15 One of the main merits of our
model is actually to show that individualization of farm units can result from land scarcity
even in the absence of induced technical change.
15In a dynamic setup of the model, one might wish to assume that allowing the departure of members
to form separate branch households is a more irreversible step than granting individual plots to staying
members. This would obviously reinforce the case for the mixed farm structure.
39References
Ault, D.E., and G.L. Rutman. 1979. \The Development of Individual Rights to Property
in Tribal Africa." Journal of Law and Economics 22(1):163-182.
Baland, J.M., and J.P. Platteau. 1998. \Dividing the Commons - A Partial Assessment of
the New Institutional Economics of Property Rights." American Journal of Agricultural
Economics 80:644-650.
Basu, K. 1986. \The Market for Land - An Analysis of Interim Transactions." Journal of
Development Economics 20:163-177.
Bergstrom, T. 1997. \A survey of theories of the family" Handbook of Population and
Family Economics ed. Rosenzweig, M.R., O. Stark. Elsevier, Amsterdam.
Binswanger, H., and J. McIntire. 1987. \Behavioural and Material Determinants of Pro-
duction Relations in Land-Abundant Tropical Agriculture." Economic Development and
Cultural Change 36(1): 73-99.
Binswanger, H., J. McIntire, and C. Udry. 1989. \Production Relations in Semi-Arid
African Agriculture."in Bardhan, P. (ed), The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions.
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 122-144.
Binswanger, H., and M. Rosenzweig. 1986. \Behavioral and Material Determinants of
Production Relations in Agriculture." Journal of Development Studies 22(3):503{539.
Bolton, P. and M. Dewatripont. 2004. Contract Theory The MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
Boserup, E. 1965. Conditions of Agricultural Growth. Aldine Publishing Co, Chicago.
Demsetz, H. 1967. \Toward a Theory of Property Rights." American Economic Review
57(2):347-359.
Du
o, E. and C. Udry. 2004. \Intrahousehold Resource Allocation in Cote d'Ivoire: Social
Norms, Separate Accounts, and Consumption Choices." NBER Working Paper No. 10498
40Eswaran M., and A. Kotwal. 1985. \A Theory of Contractual Structure in Agriculture."
American Economic Review 75(3):352-367.
Fafchamps, M. 2001. \Intrahousehold Access to Land and Sources of Ineciency: Theory
and Concepts." Access to Land, Rural Poverty and Public Action ed. de Janvry, A., G.
Gordillo, J.P. Platteau and E. Sadoulet. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Feder, G., and D. Feeny. 1991. \Land Tenure and Property Rights: Theory and Implica-
tions for Development Policy." The World Bank Economic Review 75(1): 162-77.
Feder, G., and R. Noronha. 1987. \Land Rights Systems and Agricultural Development
in Sub-Saharan Africa" Research Observer 2(2): 143-169.
Foster, A., and M. Rosenzweig. 2002. \Household Division and Rural Economic Growth."
Review of Economic Studies 69:839{869.
Hayami, Y., and V. Ruttan. 1985. Agricultural Development: An International Perspec-
tive. John Hopkins Unversity Press, Baltimore.
Haugerud, A. 1993. The Culture of Politics in Modern Kenya. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Meyer, C.A. 1989. Agrarian Reform in the Dominican Republic: An Associative Solution
to the Collective/Individual Dilemma. World Development 17(8): 1255-1267
Pingali, P., Y. Bigot, and H.P. Binswanger. 1987. \Agricultural Mechanization and the
Evolution of Farming Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa." Baltimore and London: The Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Platteau, J.-P. and J. Nugent. 1992. Share Contracts and their Rationale: Lessons from
Marie Fishing. Journal of Development Studies 28(3): 386-422
Putterman, L.. 1983. A Modied Collective Agriculture in Rural Growth-with-Equity:
Reconsidering the Private, Unimodal Solution. World Development 11(2): 77-100
41Appendix
A Analytical framework
A.1 Optimization in the pure collective regime
In this section, we formally derive the Lagrangian multipliers for the maximization problem
in the strictly collective regime. The Lagrangian in this case is:
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If the participation constraint is unbinding, then 
 = 0 and 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equation, we can show that in that case,  is constant:
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With f(a;l) = al1  and v(l) = !l2, we have
ffLL
f2






16To obtain the rst equality note that with f(a;l) = al1 , we have: fL = (1   epsilon)al  and
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42these expressions in the above equality yields:









If the participation constraint is binding, then the rst inequality implies: 
 = n + 
fL
f .
The second equality can thus be rewritten:
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Replacing v0 with 1 
n fL and solving for , we obtain:
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A.2 Optimization in the mixed regime, for a given AI
In this section we formally derive the Lagrangian multipliers to the problem described by
Equation (8). These multipliers have dierent expressions depending on whether the partic-
ipation constraint binds.
43A.2.1 Unbinding participation constraint
We show below that if the participation constraint does not bind, then @V
@AI < 0. If the
participation constraint does not bind,  = 0 and the FOC are:
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In the following, we use the subscript C for the production function on the collective eld











. Since  is unambiguously






LA is negative, so
that unless the participation constraint binds, it is always optimal for the father to decrease
the size of the individual plots, or to increase the size of the collective eld.
A.2.2 Binding participation constraint
The FOC of the maximization problem in this case are:
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+ v0(lC + lI) = 0. Equation (15)
implies:
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This implies  > 0,  < 0. We also know that  > 0 (property of the Lagrangian multiplier
of an inequality). We derive the expression for  (needed below) from equation (20):
 = n +
(fC
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A.3 Splitting: signing the incentive eects
A.3.1 Splitting under the pure collective regime
In this section, we show that @lC
@n < 0 and @
@n < 0 so that both the labor incentive eect and
the compensation eect are negative. Consider rst the case of an unbinding participation
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With a constant return to scale production function, we have nlfLL + nA
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It is clear that @lC
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@ is clearly negative.
Consider now the case of a binding participation constraint. We apply the Cramer's

















































Assuming that f is homogeneous of degree 1 (or that we have constant returns to scale)




@n . It implies that f is homogeneous of
degree 1 and fL of degree 0, so that by virtue of Euler's theorem: f = n A
NfA + nlfL and
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This expression is unambiguously negative (recall that v0 = 1 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Both the numerator and the denominator are negative so that this expression is unam-
47biguously negative.
A.3.2 Splitting under the mixed regime
In this section, we show that @lC
@n and @
@n from equation (10) are both negative so that both
the labor incentive eect and the compensation eect are negative. For a given AI, , lC
and lI are the (implicit) solution to the following system:
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
E1 = 1 
n fL(( A
N   AI)n;lC + L)   v0(lC + lI) = 0
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(23)
Like in the case of the pure collective regime, we can use the system of equations that
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To obtain this expression, we used again the fact that f is homogeneous of degree 1 and
fL homogeneously of degree 0. Both the numerator and denominator are unambiguously






































































NUM2 is unambiguously negative so that @lC
@n < 0.
It is evident that @R
@n has an ambiguous sign.
B Analytical results
B.1 Proof of lemma 1
B.1.1 The case of the strictly collective regime
We start with the impact of A on . First we show that  is monotonically decreasing in
 A (or: @
@A > 0). This implies that  tends to its minimal value when A tends to zero.
Then we show that for all  > 0, there exists a land endowment such that the head would
choose . This implies that the limit of  when A tends to 0 cannot be strictly positive: it
has to be 0.
As A decreases or u increases, the participation constraint becomes tighter and eventually




G1 = 0 = 1 
n fL(nA
N ;nl)   v0(l)






  v(l)   u
(24)
To nd the sign of @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This expression is unambiguously positive. Assuming f(a;l) = ala  and v(l) = !l2, we can










For all  > 0, we can then nd A such that the system is satised. Indeed, the second


































































Let us now turn to the impact of u on . To prove the Lemma, we just need to show
that @
@u < 0, and then the argument developed above applies: For each  > 0 there exists a
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nfL ((1   )fL   v0)
This last expression is unambiguously negative.
B.1.2 The case of the mixed regime
To prove the lemma, we use the same arguments as in the pure collective case. We show
rst that @
@u < 0 and @
@A > 0. We assume the same functional forms as previously. For all
given values of AI, lC;lI and  are the solution to the following system:
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
E1 = 1 
n fL(( A
N   AI)n;nlC)   v0(lC + lI) = 0

















































































































































L = v0, we have (1   )fC
L > v0 and NUM4 is unambiguously positive, so that
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52Clearly, NUM3 is negative and we showed in section A.3.2 that DENOM is also negative
(see section A.3.2). Therefore: @
@u < 0.
The next step is to argue that 's lower limit (when u tends to +1 or A tends to zero)
cannot be strictly positive. Indeed, for all  > 0, we can nd u such that the system dening
lC;lI and  holds. To see it, notice that from the dierence E2 E1 we can extract lI(lC;).17
Then E1 denes lC().18 As a result, we can write lI() and lC() and plug these expressions
in E3. Finally, E3 denes u(): for all  > 0 there is a u such that  is a solution to the
system. Combined with the fact that @
@u < 0, this implies that the limit of  when u tends
to +1 can only be 0 (since @
@u < 0 implies that  tends asymptotically to its limit and the
lower limit cannot be strictly larger than 0). This holds true for all possible values of AI,
and, in particular, for the optimal AI.
We prove in a similar manner that the limit of  when A tends to +1 can only be zero.
Holding AI constant, for any  > 0, we can nd A such that  solves the above system of























into E3, we obtain an equation that neither
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53equation that implicitly denes lI, independently of A. Thus lC can also be dened inde-
pendently of A, and equation (26) implies that, for all  > 0 and AI, there exists a value of
A such that  solves the above system of equations. This holds true a fortiori when AI is
allowed to vary.
B.2 Proof of lemma 2
If the head prefers the mixed regime, we know that the participation constraint is binding
for the optimal AI in that regime (appendix A.2.1). To show that mix > col, we argue
that mix  col is impossible.
If mix  col then the participation constraint is not binding in the mixed regime
since dependents utility is strictly greater in the mixed regime than in the collective regime
(where it is greater or equal to u). To see it, consider the out-of-equilibrium situation where
dependents would apply the same eort in the mixed regime than in the collective regime
and would apply it to the same extent on the collective eld and on their private plots. In
that case, overall farm production is the same in both regimes but the part retained by the
dependents is greater in the mixed regime (so that their utility is larger): per unit of land
under collective production they get at least the same income as before while they are full
claimants on the area under individual production and can thus extract more income from
it. We know that this is not an equilibrium situation and that by reallocating eort so as to
equalize their marginal income from the collective and their individual plot, they can further
increase their utility. It is thus clear that if mix  col, the participation constraint is not
binding in the mixed regime, which would never be chosen.
54B.3 Proof of proposition 1
We rst compute the impact of an increase in A on the head's rent under each regime to
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ffLA is the substitution elasticity of production factors. Because LA = 1 in the









A unit increase in the total family endowment increases the area of the farm by n
N and
the impact on the head's rent is equal to n
N times the marginal productivity of land on the
collective eld.
The same holds in the collective regime. If the participation constraint is unbinding, then
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55To obtain the last simplication in the above expression, we use again the fact that fA =
fLA
ffL.
If the participation constraint is binding we know 
 = n + 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In both regimes, as expected, the head's rent is monotonically increasing in A.
Consider a given farm area A and a given family size n. If total eort is smaller in the
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If mix  col, we have shown above (see section B.2) that the participation constraint is
not binding in the mixed regime, so that this is not a relevant case to examine. Finally, we
have established that wherever the mixed regime is relevant (in the sense that there exists AI
such that the participation constraint is binding in the mixed regime and it is not trivially
inferior to the collective regime), the head's rent is monotonically increasing in both regimes
and it increases faster in the collective regime than in the mixed.
Suppose that the head is indierent between the mixed and the collective regime. As
shown above, a marginal decrease in A decreases his rent to a greater extent in the collective
than in the mixed regime when AI is maintained constant, so that the mixed regime is
strictly preferred. This holds true a fortiori when the head can change AI. If we consider
a marginal increase in A, the head's rent increases more in the collective than in the mixed
regime when AI is maintained constant. If AI is allowed to vary, could the head's rent
increase to a greater extent in the mixed regime? The answer is negative because a marginal
increase in A has a greater impact on the head's rent in the collective than in the mixed
regime for all relevant AI.20
20To see this, consider a marginal increase in A from A1 to A2. Call AI(A) the optimal size of individual
plot when total land endowment is A, Rcol(A) the head's rent in the collective regime and Rmix(A;AI(A)),
his rent in the mixed regime. We know: Rmix(A2;AI(A2))   Rmix(A1;AI(A2)) < Rcol(A2;)   Rcol(A1).
In addition, by denition, it is true that: Rmix(A2;AI(A2))   Rmix(A1;AI(A1)) < Rmix(A2;AI(A2))  
57Let Amin be the level of land endowment such that the head's rent is null in the collective
regime. As A goes from Amin to +1, either the collective regime dominates everywhere,
or there exists a level of land endowment  A such that the head is just indierent between
the mixed and the collective regimes. Then, for A <  A, the head prefers the mixed regime,
while for A >  A, the head prefers the collective regime.21
B.4 Proof of proposition 2
We rst show that, if u tends to 0, the collective regime dominates the mixed regime. We
then examine the in
uence of u on the head's propensity to give out individual elds when
he is just indierent between both regimes.
When u tends to zero, the participation constraint becomes unbinding in the mixed regime
for all AI. To prove this result, let us show that, if the incentive constraints are satised,
the participation constraint is automatically satised for values of u very close to zero. With
the Cobb-Douglas production function and the polynomial cost of eort (v(l) = !l2), the
incentive constraints are:
1 
n (1   ")(A   nAI)"(nlC) " = 2!(lC + lI), and (1   ")(AI)"(lI) " = 2!(lC + lI).
Rmix(A1;AI(A2)). It follows that: Rmix(A2;AI(A2)) Rmix(A1;AI(A1)) < Rcol(A2;) Rcol(A1). Even
when the father adjusts AI in the mixed regime, therefore, his rent does not increase as much as in the
collective regime.
21It is indeed not possible that in the range Amin and  A, there exist a land endowment a where the mixed
regime is irrelevant in the sense that the participation constraint would be unbinding and the collective is
chosen. This would imply that at a, the participation constraint is unbinding in the mixed regime, while at
 A it is binding. This is impossible since a decrease in A tightens the participation constraint.
58Adding the two expressions, we get:
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Since the incentive constraints on the individual and collective elds imply: 1 
n (1 ")(A 
nAI)"(nlC) " = (1   ")(AI)"(lI) " = 2!(lC + lI), the last two terms on both sides of the
previous equality cancel out and we obtain:
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The LHS is the level of utility achieved by a member. Since it is strictly greater than zero, we
conclude that, for values of u very close to zero, the participation constraint is automatically
satised. The mixed regime never dominates if the participation constraint is unbinding for
all AI, since the father's rent is then monotonically decreasing in AI (see section A.2.1). As
a result, when u tends to zero, the head of a collective farm never nds it optimal to grant
individual plots.
Furthermore, when u tends to zero, the member's participation constraint is unbinding
in the collective regime. To show it, we use a similar argument than in the case of the mixed
regime. The incentive constraint is: 1 




n (A)"(nl)1 " = 2!l2, which implies: 1 "
n
1 
n f > !l2 and nally 1 
n f   v(l) > 0.
Thus, for values of u very close to zero, the participation constraint is automatically satised.
59We now turn to the analysis of the impact of a marginal change in u on the head's rent
in both regimes. The envelop theorem implies that a marginal increase in u decreases the
father's rent by 
 in the pure collective regime and by  in the mixed regime (since we know
that the optimal AI in the mixed regime is such that the participation constraint binds, cf
footnote 3.3.), where the Lagrangian multipliers have a parallel expression:

































With a Cobb-Douglas production function (f(A;l) = A"l1 ") and a polynomial cost of eort








1 ". Using these relationships, the above
expressions become:

























When the head is just indierent between the pure collective and the mixed regimes,
we know that m > s (appendix B.2) so that, 
 > . At a point of indierence, a
marginal increase in the reservation utility therefore has a greater (negative) impact in the
pure collective regime than in the mixed regime. The head would thus strictly prefer the
mixed regime. Conversely, a marginal decrease in the reservation utility induces the head to
strictly prefer the collective regime.
Finally, as u goes from 0 to +1, either the collective regime dominates everywhere, or
an indierence level of utility exists, and the mixed regime dominates for utility levels higher
than that threshold level, while the collective regime dominates for smaller levels.
60B.5 Proof of proposition 3 and proposition 4
To analyze how a marginal change in u or in A changes the incentive to split the family, we
examine the conditions under which @R
@n > 0.
B.5.1 Land endowment, reservation utility, and the decision to split in the pure
collective regime
We know that, as u tends to zero, the participation constraint becomes unbinding (sec-
tion B.4).To obtain an expression for @R
@n when the participation constraint does not bind,
we replace @
@n and @l
@n in equation 10 by the expression obtained in section A.3.1, and we use
 =  
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We can thus conclude that @R
@n is unambiguously positive, meaning that it is never de-
sirable for the head to let one son leave the farm with some land. By implication, when u
tends to zero, the head will never choose to split the family.
Conversely when u tends to +1, the participation constraint is binding and we can show
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1 ". This considerably simplies the previous expres-
















This condition is increasingly dicult to satisfy as n increases (for all n:
@ 







), which is intuitive. Once the family is really large, it becomes less interesting
for the head to keep it whole.










This last inequality holds for all n > 1, and suggests that the family head will always split
the family if u is innitely large
We have just shown that the head of a collective farm chooses to split the family when u
tends to +1 while he prefers to keep the family whole when u tends to 0. Since the father's
rent is monotonically decreasing in u, there must exist a unique level of u so that the head
is just indierent between splitting and not.
Let us now show that when land is very abundant, the participation constraint does
not bind. We argue that for any given reservation utility u, we can nd a land endowment



































































We know that, if the participation constraint is not binding,  = 1+
2 (section A.1). We thus
have to ask whether, for large enough A, u  u with  = 1+
2 . The above equation implies























In particular, when A tends to +1, this condition will be satised for all u so that the par-
ticipation constraint is unbinding. We have shown above that, if the participation constraint
does not bind, it is never optimal to split the family. Therefore, when A tends to +1, the
head will not split the family.










When A gets very small, then  tends to 0 (proof in section ??) and we have:
@R
@n





This last inequality holds for all n > 1, which suggests that the family head will always split
the family if A is close to zero.
Since the father's rent is monotonically increasing in A, there exists a level of A such
that he is just indierent between splitting the family and keeping it whole.
B.5.2 Land endowment, reservation utility, and the decision to split the family
in the mixed regime
We know that, if A tends to +1 or u tends to zero, the collective regime always dominates
the mixed regime. We therefore focus on the head's propensity to split in the mixed regime
when A tends to zero or u tends to +1.
64Let us derive an expression for @R
@n in the case where the participation constraint binds
(which is the case when A tends to 0 or u tends to +1). Replacing @
@n and @l
@n in equation (10)
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When A tends to 0 or u tends to +1,  tends to 0 (proof in section B.1.2) and we have:
@R
@n















This last inequality holds for all n > 1. We may therefore conclude that, when land is very
scarce or the reservation utility is very large, the father will choose to split the family under
the mixed regime.
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